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 Philosophers should be interested in ‘common currency’ claims
in the cognitive and behavioural sciences1
David Spurrett
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
spurrett@ukzn.ac.za
A recurring claim in a number of behavioural, cognitive and neuro-scientific 
literatures is that there is, or must be, a unidimensional ‘common currency’ in which 
the values of different available options are represented. There is striking variety in 
the quantities or properties that have been proposed as determinants of the ordering 
in motivational strength. Among those seriously suggested are pain and pleasure, 
biological fitness, reward and reinforcement, and utility among economists, 
who have regimented the notion of utility in a variety of ways, some of them 
incompatible. This topic deserves philosophical attention for at least the following 
reasons. (1) Repeated invocation of the ‘common currency’ idiom isn’t merely 
terminological coincidence because most of the claims are competing explanations 
either of manifest pattern in choices, or of order in the processes producing choice. 
(2) We can’t suppose that the different currency claims within each area are 
compatible, because there are significant obstacles to identifying pairs of members 
of either the ‘pattern’ or ‘process’ group. (3) There are, finally, seriously opposed 
positions about the relationships (generally, and in specific cases including that of 
humans) between the pattern facts and the process facts. There are philosophical 
positions both favouring and opposing a common currency. But direct consideration 
of the abstract relationships between claims about common currencies across 
scientific settings, and the arguments for and against these claims, is relatively rare. 
There is, though, much of philosophical interest to be found here.
Introduction
A recurring claim in a number of behavioural, cognitive and neuro-scientific literatures is that 
there is in fact, or must be, a unidimensional ‘common currency’ in which the values (actual, 
or expected) of different available options are represented. These currency metaphors partly 
succeed older, less overtly economic, yet similarly quantitative ways of speaking of decision-
making as a kind of ‘weighing’, or of options attracting with varying ‘force’. What these 
images share is doing approximate justice to the pre-theoretical notion that the motivational 
import – to the choosing agent – of two options may be equal, or unequal, and when unequal 
that the relative difference between them can differ in magnitude.2 When all options are taken 
to stand in these relations, whatever metaphors are invoked, we are on the way to a common 
currency thesis.
Theses about common currencies get fleshed out in a variety of ways as the pre-theoretical 
notion is regimented in specific scientific and philosophical contexts. Different kinds of argument 
and evidence are appropriate to defending the more specific formulations. Here are two fairly 
typical and widely cited examples:
In natural settings, the goals competing for behavior are complex, multidimensional 
objects and outcomes. Yet, for orderly choice to be possible, the utility of all competing 
1 I’m grateful to David Papineau and Blaize Kaye for discussion of some of the issues in this paper, and to an anonymous reviewer for some 
very constructive and useful suggestions.
2 Some have an opposed hunch that there is no fact of the matter about the relative ranking of at least some options, perhaps because they 
are incommensurable (e.g. Williams 1981; Raz 1986).
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resources must be represented on a single, common dimension (Shizgal & Conover 1996: 
pp. 37–38).
Any attempt to understand behavior in terms of the evolutionary advantage that it might 
confer has to find a “common currency” for comparing the costs and benefits of various 
alternative courses of action (McNamara and Houston 1986: p. 358).
These arguments are at least superficially similar enough that they might be taken as variants 
of a single argument, or as complementary arguments for the same claim. Both seem to demand 
a single currency, encouraging viewing them as complementary. Indeed, the prospect that they, or 
combinations of similar seeming arguments, might collectively justify multiple and fundamentally 
distinct currencies (as opposed to superficially distinct ones that turned out to be equivalent) is 
prima facie perplexing.
One claim I defend here is that this superficial appearance – of complementary arguments 
for one claim – is misleading. Significantly different claims about common currencies can and 
should be recognised. The remark by Shizgal and Conover occurs in discussion of experiments 
demonstrating that behaviour allocation in rats choosing between natural (gustatory)3 rewards 
and brain stimulation reward is sensitive to opportunity cost in the unchosen reward, and that 
combination rewards with components in both modalities are (approximately) valued as sums 
of their components. The ‘common currency’ in question is reward magnitude for the individual 
rat. And Shizgal and Conover claim that this kind of pattern in allocation – the sensitivity 
to opportunity cost and disposition to value combination rewards as sums of their components 
that they call ‘orderly choice’ – is empirically observable and warrants an inference to a 
psychologically real common currency.
McNamara and Houston, on the other hand, are describing the project of behavioural ecology. 
They observe that this presupposes that behaviours have determinate fitness consequences, and 
seeks to determine those consequences and quantify their relative contributions to fitness. One of 
their central claims is, furthermore, that the main successes of behavioural ecology up to that time 
had focused on restricted currencies, such as net rate of energy intake in optimal foraging models 
(e.g. Pyke et al. 1977), and made relatively little headway with interpreting more comprehensive 
behavioural repertoires and life histories from the perspective of fitness. If such a comprehensive 
mapping could be found, though, it would express the relative values of all behaviours in an 
evolutionary common currency.
The two currency theses (Shizgal and Conover’s on the one hand, and McNamara and Houston’s on 
the other) are clearly not equivalent. Among the differences, one is centrally concerned with fitness, 
the other with something closer to subjective (expected) utility. Only one of them seems concerned 
with the choice-making process. Perhaps the repeated occurrence of ‘common currency’ talk is simply 
an uninteresting coincidence of terminology: researchers talking about distinct phenomena happen to 
use a superficially similar idiom. Perhaps, though, there is a tangle worth trying to unravel.
I favour the latter view, and in this brief paper offer a compressed survey of the terrain in which 
common currency theses occur, along with a preliminary defence of the claims that there is a 
tangle at all, and that the tangle deserves philosophical attention. Identifying all of the interestingly 
distinct claims about common currencies, and assessing the bodies of evidence relevant to 
each, would require more than a single paper. My aims here are more modest. In what follows I 
introduce a classification of common currency theses (‘Common currency claims distinguished’), 
and explain why some of the thus classified theses should be understood as competitors 
(‘Competitors, not complements’). Not all currency theses conflict, but where combinations of 
them are possibly complementary, we find additional disputes and disagreements (‘Inferences 
from ultimate to proximal currency theses’), and this set of issues is philosophically interesting 
(‘This is philosophically interesting’). 
3 The ‘natural’ rewards were modifi ed in various ways in order to manipulate their similarities to and differences from brain stimulation 
reward (BSR). Shizgal and Conover make further inferences about the neural representation of value on the basis of how BSR and 
gustatory reinforcement respond differently to these manipulations. 
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Common currency claims distinguished
Distinct claims about common currencies or value scales occur in various scientific settings. 
Generically and perforce loosely, because different more precise formulations pull in partly 
incompatible directions, a common currency is a unidimensional quantity that different options 
‘have’ in varying amounts. A common currency is a representation of what an agent maximises, or, 
more weakly, it is some value ordering with which the agent’s behaviour is consistent.
The two main ways of clarifying currency claims are, first, to specify the characteristics of the 
value scale (whether ordinal, interval, etc.) and, second, to describe groupings within the range 
of currency theses and the types of explanations in which they feature. The latter task commands 
priority because the specific regimentation of the notion of scale that is appropriate depends on 
what purportedly is being measured or described and how. Here I focus mostly on classification, 
making only passing remarks about scale.4
Claims about common currencies are offered as explanations of one or both of two putative facts:
• the currency represents the fundamental principle in some pattern in the choices made by some 
agent, or
• the currency is a psychologically real characteristic of the processes by which choice
is produced.
Claims about pattern and process can be combined, or made separately, as I explain below. The 
two are importantly distinct. To mark the distinction I follow, but slightly adapt, an established 
distinction, and refer to ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximal’ currencies. An ultimate currency is a construct in a 
descriptive or explanatory theory of the behaviour of some agent. A proximal currency, on the other 
hand, is supposed to play some role in the processes by which options are selected by an agent.
Any single ranking of options on a scale such that behaviour can be described as – perhaps 
approximately – consistent with that ordering counts as an instance of what I will call an 
‘ultimate’ common currency. An ultimate currency relates values to options, or to what selecting 
those options achieves or perhaps has the function of achieving. It is easy to imagine possible 
instantiations of an ultimate currency (‘all of Jim’s actions are efficiently ordered to contribute to 
the greater glory of the Flying Spaghetti Monster’) but among the scientifically interesting forms 
of consistency, two families stand out. One of these relate to fitness, and the other to some of other 
form of utility.
I therefore say that an ultimate currency can be evolutionary or subjective. Here I’m knowingly, 
albeit slightly, departing from standard usage, insofar as the usual way of distinguishing proximal 
from ultimate has the latter taken to be synonymous with fitness promoting. The standard sense 
is partly preserved here, because what I call an evolutionary ultimate currency attributes values 
that are a function of contribution to fitness. A guiding presumption of behavioural ecology is that 
behavioural dispositions make contributions to fitness, and that to the extent that the dispositions 
have a heritable basis, selection will tend to drive them towards making (constrained) optimal 
contributions. The statement by McNamara and Houston briefly discussed above is an exemplary 
assertion about an evolutionary ultimate currency.
There are compelling reasons for thinking that natural selection will operate on at least some 
behavioural tendencies, and so provide a strong general justification for the project of behavioural 
ecology. Nonetheless, the question of whether the behaviour allocation of the individuals in any 
particular species does indeed tend to optimise fitness (or would have in historical selective 
environments) is an empirical one. Behavioural ecologists have studied many species and types 
of behaviour and achieved striking successes in restricted domains such as foraging and mate 
selection. These successes have often relied on focusing on a simplified and more empirically 
tractable currency such as net rate of calorie intake (in the case of foraging), or the health of the 
selected mate (in mate selection). These proxy currencies plausibly contribute to fitness. Even 
so, success in relating behaviour patterns to the proxies falls short of establishing relationships 
between all behavioural dispositions and overall fitness in any species. Two of the most serious 
shortfalls are in the area of relative allocation between significantly different modalities (such as 
4 For a classic discussion of the formal properties of some notions of preference see Luce and Suppes (1965), and for more general remarks 
on scales and measurement see Suppes and Zinnes (1963).
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calorie intake versus pursuit of mating opportunities versus predator avoidance) and variation in 
allocation over extended periods of time, including the full life-history.
A subjective ultimate currency, in contrast, attributes values that are a function of the revealed 
preferences or inferred utilities of the individual agent, without requiring any relationship to 
fitness. The paradigmatic sciences of subjective ultimate currencies are microeconomics (with 
variously regimented notions of utility functions revealed through consumption) and behavioural 
psychology (where strength of reinforcement is defined in terms of effect on patterns of behaviour 
allocation). Evolutionary ultimate currencies, then, have stronger empirical conditions than 
subjective ones, because the latter require ‘mere’ consistency in behaviour, whereas the former 
require consistency in contributing to fitness. 
The distinction between evolutionary and subjective ultimate currencies, as I’ve sketched it here, 
conceals considerable technical detail. There are competing fitness concepts, debates over the level 
at which selection operates, and differing positions over the correct individuation principles for 
genes, genomes, species and other relevant categories. There are also competing utility concepts, 
offering different explanations of the same empirical data. (For example, some make randomness 
a feature of the utility representation itself, while others hypothesise randomness in the form of 
‘trembling hands’ in the process of expressing the preferences.) Surveying this varied terrain is 
beyond the scope of a brief paper, but one further complication concerning two different ways of 
understanding ‘consistency’ must be noted.
Economists tend to favour a strict notion of consistency because they recognise that predictable 
inconsistency makes agents vulnerable to systematic exploitation. Perhaps the best-known specific 
version of this worry is the argument that an agent with cyclical preferences5 could be used as a 
‘money pump’ (see Ross 2005: ch. 5). Such an agent would freely pay for a series of trades that 
eventually left it with no effective money or stock. This convinces most economists that viable 
agency requires acyclicity (‘transitivity’), among other criteria for consistency. Behavioural 
psychologists, on the other hand, seek phenomenological fits of functions to empirical data, and 
have recognised patterns in behaviour objectionable to microeconomists. The clearest example 
of this is their accepting that the generalised Matching Law applies to delayed rewards (Chung 
and Herrnstein 1967). This implies that rewards are valued in inverse proportion to delay (i.e. by 
a hyperbolic function), and the relative desirability of incentives at different times can change 
simply with the passage of time. Given appropriate repeated choices, cyclical preferences follow.6 
That should mean vulnerability to money pumping, and non-behavioural economists have 
favoured delay discounting according to exponential functions largely for this reason (again, see 
Ross 2005: ch. 5). The hyperbolic delay discounter is inconsistent insofar as she temporarily 
prefers smaller rewards that are immanently available. But to the behavioural psychologist her 
choices are all consistently reward seeking, in the sense that once some empirical parameters have 
been determined, relative rates of behaviour are predictable.
The other main role for currency claims is to explain the processes by which options are 
selected. Such theses assert the existence of a ‘proximal’ common currency. Here are some 
examples. A realist about desires who holds that for any pair of desires there is a fact of the matter 
about whether they are of equal strength or one is stronger, is committed to a common currency 
thesis. Shizgal and Conover’s inference regarding a ‘single, common dimension’ is a scientifically 
motivated claim about the cognitive requirements of producing ‘orderly choice’. A conventional 
chess-playing programme generating a tree of possible game-states, then attaching values to them 
on the basis of some algorithm, in order to select a best move (among the options explored in the 
available time) implements a common currency. Finally, the leading current scientific research 
programme focused on a proximal common currency is neuroeconomics, which seeks to determine 
how utilities are represented in brains, and how these representations are processed in choosing 
and learning (e.g. Levy & Glimcher 2012).
A claim asserting a proximal common currency, then, is not any assertion about mechanisms 
producing behaviour, even consistent behaviour. A proximal common currency is, rather, a 
5 In the sense of preferring bundle a to b, bundle b to c, and also bundle c to a.
6 Nobody has done more than George Ainslie when it comes to thinking seriously about what it would mean for humans if we value rewards 
approximately in inverse proportion to their delay (see Ainslie 1992, 2001).
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structured and integrated set of states that represents values, in (at least) the weak sense that it 
carries information about a mapping between actions and/or states of the world and values in an 
ultimate currency, and this information is consumed by the cognitive processes selecting actions.
Not everyone who thinks that behaviour is consistent, and that there is a mechanical process 
explaining behaviour selection, is committed to a proximal common currency. This is because not 
all views about how behaviour is caused involve representations, including value representations. 
One reason is respect for ‘Lloyd Morgan’s canon’:
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher 
psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of one which stands lower on the 
psychological scale (Morgan 1894: p. 53).
Giant sea slugs (Pleurobranchaea), for example, are carnivorous and typically eat any animal 
matter they run into, ‘including other sea-slugs and their eggs’ (Manning & Dawkins 1998: p. 226). 
They do not, however, eat their own eggs during egg laying. This disposition is obviously fitness 
enhancing: creatures that routinely consume their own offspring leave fewer viable descendants. The 
mechanism that stops sea slugs from eating their own eggs, though, while it could be regarded as in 
some very broad sense ‘cognitive’ is not one in which values are represented (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 
2002).7 When sea slugs lay eggs, they release a hormone that inhibits movement of the mouth (Davis 
et al. 1977). This simple override exemplifies the ‘subsumption’ relationship between control layers 
championed by Rodney Brooks (e.g. 1991), who famously maintained that ‘intelligent’ behaviour 
could be achieved in the absence of representation.
There are three generic and complementary forms of argument in favour of a proximal 
currency. The first is an inference to best explanation where an internal currency representation 
is hypothesised on the basis of observed order in behaviour (e.g. Shizgal & Conover 1996). The 
second considers abstract features of a control system, and argues that control bottlenecks make it 
more likely that some unified value representation is playing a role in determining how the degrees 
of freedom in the system are allocated. This line of thinking, going back at least to Sherrington, is 
sometimes called the ‘final common path’ argument (e.g. McFarland & Sibley 1975). Finally, there 
are cases where it is claimed that a proximal currency has effectively been observed in action, 
through study of the behaviour control system at work (e.g. in neuroeconomics). All three are, 
furthermore, contested.
Scientifically interesting talk about common currencies can almost entirely be classified into 
arguments in favour of or against one kind of currency (proximal, evolutionary ultimate or 
subjective ultimate), and in favour of or against specific inferences from ultimate to proximal 
currencies. In the following section I argue briefly that the currency theses and related arguments 
in current science warrant philosophical examination.
Competitors, not complements
I discuss attempted inferences between distinct currency thesis types, especially from ultimate 
to proximal, in the next section. Here I consider relationships between ultimate (pattern) and 
proximal (process) common currency theses. The number of at least superficially distinct 
common currency theses is striking. As we’ve seen, behavioural ecologists seek to relate patterns 
of behaviour to their contribution to fitness. Early utilitarians, and some contemporary theorists 
about pain and analgesia claim that pain and pleasure provide a common scale (e.g. Bentham 
1789; Cabanac 1971; Leknes & Tracey 2010). Behaviourist psychologists refer to reward or 
reinforcement, while contemporary economists are more likely to advance a currency thesis about 
utility. In addition, some of the central concepts that characterise the scales have been theoretically 
elaborated in varied ways. This is most striking in the case of utility, both within economics, 
including behavioural economics, and in neighbouring areas such as decision theory.
This mere proliferation is not intrinsically interesting. Perhaps the various theses are complementary. 
In the case of ultimate currencies, there is, prima facie, a prospect of pluralistic harmony, because such 
7 I follow Godfrey-Smith’s suggested policy regarding understanding ‘cognitive’ inclusively to embrace the processes controlling behaviour, 
even in systems (e.g. some plants and fungi) that lack central nervous systems.
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theses are claims about pattern, and more than one kind of pattern can be manifest in the same data. It 
is, though, an observation familiar to the point of banality that subjective preferences – for example, 
for sex with contraceptives – don’t always coincide with what is fitness promoting. More generally, 
and not only in humans, what is fitness promoting is not always motivating and what is motivating is 
not always fitness promoting. The fact that animal subjects in behavioural experiments would work for 
non-nutritive sweeteners, for example, was recognised decades ago as an obstacle to identifying reward 
with evolutionary interest (see e.g. Rachlin 1991: ch. 3).
It is not unusual, in fact, to find biologists expressing scepticism about the plausibility of a 
currency thesis outside biology, even while being optimistic within it. Maynard-Smith, for 
example, suggested that ‘it has turned out that game theory […] is more readily applied to biology 
than to the field of economic behavior for which it was originally designed’. And part of his 
justification for this is that he finds utility to be ‘a somewhat artificial and uncomfortable concept’, 
whereas in biology ‘Darwinian fitness provides a natural and genuinely one-dimensional scale’ 
(Maynard Smith 1982, quoted in Glimcher 2002: p. 323).
Many economists and behaviourists dispute this, on the grounds that the utility concept is 
in much better shape than Maynard-Smith allows. My point is not to endorse either view, but 
to observe that the lack of consensus suggests work for applied philosophy of science. One 
impediment to taking sides is, in any event, that economists disagree with each other. There are 
competing formulations of utility and disputes over which do best justice to the evidence, or best 
suit what theoretical purposes. I noted above that economists’ concern with consistency leads them 
to favour exponential delay discount functions, while behavioural psychologists are more inclined 
towards hyperbola-like functions. This is just one instance of a wider pattern. To give one more 
example, defenders of prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979) claim that their model, 
built to account for phenomena including apparent violations of the independence axiom, and 
asymmetries of risk sensitivity in gains and losses, does better justice to data about real human 
choices. Sceptics, though, express frustration that the sheer number of free parameters in prospect 
theory undermines the empirical value of such fits (see Glimcher 2011: ch. 5).
A further incompatibility between the currency claims of behavioural ecologists and 
psychologists arises because they seek to explain somewhat different things, even while both 
calling it ‘behaviour’. We’ve noted the giant sea slug’s apparent restraint over eating its own 
eggs. My point there was to explain why behavioural ecologists are often carefully agnostic 
about proximal common currencies. Similar cases can also be used to make a different point. For 
example, a textbook case in behavioural ecology is clutch sizes in oviparous species (on birds, 
see e.g. Lack 1966). There’s substantial evidence that clutch sizes in many bird species are close 
to what would maximise lifetime reproductive success of parent birds, whose situation involves 
trade-offs between current and future clutches, and between members of individual clutches, given 
that larger (better fed) young generally do better.
Some of the determinants of clutch size plausibly respond only to phylogenetic rewards, where 
successful offspring are the payoffs in repeated games with genotypes as the players or strategies. 
There is little reason to think, though, that clutch size is modifiable by reward or punishment 
directed at the individual bird, any more than one might bribe a giant sea slug into eating its own 
eggs. But responsiveness to reinforcement is what would make it behaviour for a behavioural 
psychologists or economist.
What about proximal common currency theses? It seems that multiple distinct proximal theses 
raise the prospect of over-determination. That is, if the mechanisms of choice include more than 
one structured and integrated set of states representing values and involved in causing behaviour, 
then we’d have more explanation than we needed (‘I did it because it had the most expected utility, 
and it was pleasurable and I preferred it…’). This worry could be dissolved if it turned out that the 
different proximal currency theses expressed substantially the same claim, so that what some kind of 
agent wanted (or desired) was also what it liked (or gave it pleasure) and what promoted its fitness.
The prospects for such an outcome, though, are slim. Among other reasons, behavioural 
economists have drawn attention to various examples of apparently motivated behaviour involving 
considerable pain, for example mountaineering (e.g. Loewenstein 1999). Brain scientists studying 
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the learning, enjoying and choosing brain now mostly maintain that ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ 
(including enjoying and suffering) are neurally and functionally dissociated and that only the 
former promises to provide a perspective from which behaviour can be understood as consistent 
with some value representation (e.g. Berridge 2004). These arguments conflict directly with the 
claim defended by some researchers on hedonic experience that pain and pleasure provide a 
common currency for behaviour selection (e.g. Leknes and Tracey 2010). Whatever consensus 
eventually emerges, it seems clear that no more than one of the current proximal common currency 
theses can be correct.
Inferences from ultimate to proximal currency theses
Within categories – ultimate and proximal – different common currency theses, then, are 
competitors, but there are obvious ways that one thesis of each type could be complementary. If 
the order in behaviour warrants attributing an ultimate common currency, then this might justify 
hypothesising a proximal currency involved in producing the pattern. Conversely, if we had 
grounds to suppose that some agent’s cognitive processes implemented a proximal common 
currency, we might expect its behaviour to exhibit pattern consistent with an ultimate currency. 
Versions of both inferences have been defended, and contested.
The range of options for relations between proximal and ultimate currency theses is 
approximately analogous with those regarding the status of folk psychological kinds in in the 
philosophy of cognitive science. (Analogous might not be the best term, because folk psychology 
includes desires and beliefs. But most of the debates over folk psychology focused on epistemic 
states – like belief, perception, and memory – to the relative neglect of motivation states, like 
desires.) The major options are realism (beliefs are scientifically respectable), eliminativism 
(cognitive processes include nothing sufficiently like beliefs for belief talk to pass scientific 
muster) and attributionism, for example Dennett’s intentional stance (the conditions for belief 
attribution exclusively concern pattern in behaviour). Approximately corresponding to this, we 
find the following positions regarding proximal common currencies.
First, there are realists committed to the existence of cognitive states standing for the 
motivational strength of different courses of action in humans, and at least some other agents. 
Examples include typical realists such as Fodor (1983), some scientists specialising in hedonic 
experience (e.g. Cabanac 1971) and neuroeconomists identifying preferences with brain states. A 
paradigmatic example of an inference from pattern to proximal representation is, of course, the 
syllogism stated by Shizgal & Conover (1996) quoted above, linking ‘orderly choice’ with the 
requirement of ‘representation’ on a common scale.
Second, are eliminativist positions, denying – to varying degrees – the reality or necessity of 
cognitive states corresponding to desires. Brooks (1991), for example, argues against the need 
for representations of any kind to produce ‘intelligence’. For him the world is ‘its own best 
representation’. Brooks directs most of his fire against representations in the sense of models of 
the external environment, but his arguments clearly imply rejection of representations of values. 
Brooks’ work remains an inspiration to some philosophers. Clark (e.g. 1997: ch. 9) claims that 
pattern in human economic choices depends heavily on highly scaffolded choice environments. 
Sterelny (2003), on the other hand, suggests that the cognitive implementation of preferences in 
humans is ‘incomplete’, and that pattern in the behaviour of most non-humans can be explained 
without hypothesising preference like states as parts of their cognitive architectures.8
Finally, we find attributionists, emphasising the view that the work of those who trade in 
ultimate common currencies is independent from proximal considerations. The exemplary 
contemporary attributionist about folk psychology is Dennett, and scientific attributionists share 
behaviourist inspiration. Microeconomists mostly regiment their notion of utility so that it makes 
no psychological or hedonic commitments, in favour of specifying different degrees of consistency 
that can be empirically manifest in behaviour (e.g. Samuelson 1938; see Ross 2005). Behaviourist 
psychologists are similarly suspicious of – or hostile to – claims about hedonic experience, and 
favour more empirically tractable notions such as reinforcement and reward (Thorndike 1927).
8 See Spurrett (unpublished).
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The task of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of realism, eliminativism and attributionism 
in the case of the more epistemic aspects of folk psychology (believing, perceiving, remembering, 
inferring…) attracted wide and deep philosophical activity over several decades. Over this period 
considerably less attention was paid to the motivational aspects of folk psychology (wanting, 
desiring and choosing). In the final section of this brief survey I attempt to say a little more about 
why these topics deserve more attention.
This is philosophically interesting
Suppose that I’ve convinced a reader that there is a tangle of variously competing and (possibly) 
complementary theses about common currencies across a number of cognitive and behavioural 
sciences. Why think that this tangle is of any philosophical significance? Among the reasons I 
could offer, let me single out three.
First, there’s an image of philosophers associated with Locke as a kind of conceptual janitor for 
empirical science (Locke’s image, in the Epistle to the Reader of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, was of an ‘under-labourer’). Such conceptual work is more clearly indicated, 
perhaps, in cases where there is conflict within and between empirical sciences. To illustrate this, 
consider the different situations of behaviourism in psychology, and economics. Behaviourist 
psychologists thought of themselves, to state the obvious, as being in the psychology business, 
although driven by a distinctive vision of what it meant to do that business in a methodologically 
serious way. Their rejection of introspection was methodological, motivated by the consideration 
that scientific evidence should be inter-subjectively available. Consistently with that commitment, 
some more recent behaviourists have argued that reports of subjective experience can be a kind of 
data (e.g. Dennett’s [1991] ‘heterophenomenology’). Furthermore, advances in measuring devices 
have made previously unobservable brain processes amenable to empirical study, and so allowed 
different kinds of data to pass muster by behaviourist lights. Neuroeconomics now promises to 
provide an empirical basis for a theory of reinforcement or reward that explains observed pattern 
in what behaviour can be reinforced, and to what degree. While some individual behaviourists 
might reject specific theoretical suggestions in this area, the lack of some theory commanding 
wide acceptance has long been recognised.
Given the noted inspiration behaviourism provided for contemporary formulations of the 
concept of utility in economics, one might expect similar enthusiasm for neuroeconomics among 
working economists. Instead, one finds lively and sometimes intensely polarised debate. This 
should not be especially surprising. Unlike behaviourists, who had a distinctive view about how 
psychology should be done, economists (who used to view their discipline as at least closely 
linked to psychology – e.g. Jevons 1871) view their discipline as having made progress by getting 
out of the psychology business entirely. While some behavioural economists have more recently 
sought to move in the opposite direction, they by no means dominate the profession.
This helps explain some of the response to an enthusiastic early manifesto for 
neuroeconomics (Camerer et al. 2005). Here, and in related publications around the time, 
it was claimed that a new and importantly psychological research programme held out the 
hope of providing new ‘foundations’ for microeconomics. While the experimental techniques 
would have amazed Mill, Bentham, Jevons and their colleagues, the generic view of the 
relationship between economics and psychology probably would not. But 2005 is not the 
eighteenth century, and one of the most spirited responses to neuroeconomics was called 
‘The case for mindless economics’, and argued forcefully (whether or not correctly) that 
economics and psychology were separated by a ‘logical’ gulf, that they addressed ‘different 
questions’, used ‘different abstractions’ and relied on ‘different types of empirical evidence’, 
with the consequence that neuroscience could have no bearing on economics whatsoever (Gul 
& Pesendorfer 2005). This dispute is, among other things, a special case of wider and older 
debates about the status of folk-psychology and the prospects for reductionism. Economists – 
as scientists of something related to a folk notion of desire, even if utility is drained of most of 
the psychological content of the folk notion – are divided, inter alia, into those emphasising 
the autonomy of their enterprise, and those welcoming closer links with psychology and 
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neuroscience. A striking feature of much of these debates is repeated invocation of the notion 
of a common currency (e.g. Glimcher 2011).
Second, the specific issues relating to the status of folk-psychological explanation that arise in 
the case of motivation, and regarding the credibility of specific common currency theses, are not 
simply repetitions or generalisations of arguments about beliefs or representations. Were that the 
case, there would still be philosophical work to do, because applying whatever lessons emerged 
from the earlier debates would depend partly on details that science has revealed in the domain 
of preference and decision. Brooks’ general case against representation, for example, is widely 
recognised as failing in the case of belief except for very simple control systems, and may also fail 
in the case of preference, but perhaps not for the same reasons.
But there are also important ways in which things are different here. The ‘old’ debate over folk 
psychology was, as noted, disproportionately focused on epistemic states such as belief, memory 
and perception, and so unsurprisingly much of the traffic with philosophy was in areas relating to 
epistemology and language. But those aren’t the most obvious or promising sources of exchange in 
the case of desires. Instead, in fact, the fruitful exchange is more likely to be in areas engaged with 
thinking about practical reasoning and decision, and thinking about value. 
Third, and finally, philosophers already defend, assume or deny common currency theses or 
positions implying such commitments. A common opening move among decision theorists, for 
example, is to assume that values – whatever their ‘content’ – can be represented with the real 
numbers (e.g. Briggs 2010). More generally, what one might call ‘empiricist’ views of motivation 
suppose that there is a single marketplace of desires competing on the basis of their strength, 
however that strength is understood. On the other hand more ‘rationalist’ views favour the view 
that in at least some cases motivation is not simply a matter of relative strength of desires, but is 
rather rule-based, or otherwise based on reason in opposition to desire.
Whether or not directly defending rationalism in this very loose sense, a number of lines of 
philosophical thinking oppose, directly or by implication, the thought that all options are valued 
on a single scale. Among the examples of this are: arguments that some options or values might 
be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no fact of the matter about which is more valuable, 
or whether they are equal (e.g. Raz 1986; Williams 1981); positions maintaining that some values 
are ranked ‘lexically’ in the sense that any amount of some – no matter how small – is worth more 
than any amount of others, no matter how large (e.g. Rawls 1971). In addition, in some recent 
empirical literature we find arguments that some values are ‘protected’ or ‘sacred’ and somehow 
isolated from trade-offs with others (e.g. Baron & Spranca 1997; Atran & Ginges 2012).
A number of long-standing philosophical questions about desire, decision, preference and 
practical reasoning, then, (and this survey is woefully short of comprehensive) are partly questions 
about the degree to which motivational systems are, or can be, unified, and about the kinds of 
ranking and hierarchy systems of value or motivational strength can or should have. Common 
currency theses – whether affirmed or denied – provide a useful level of abstraction that permits 
comparison of otherwise mutually isolated theses and theories, and a substantial and tangled 
scientific terrain is debating aspects of these very questions.
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